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
*WJC*  
Executive Registry

84-2560/12

29 August 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Doug MacEachin

I think Doug MacEachin did a splendid job of drawing into a coherent program the miscellaneous initiatives we discussed on the subject of Soviet propaganda and semantic pollution. I will look forward to seeing the results and particularly the shape of the conference and its proposed participants. Please pass my compliments on to him.

  
William J. Casey

DCI

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DDI-04947-84

24 August 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: Director, Office of Soviet Analysis

SUBJECT: SOVA's Work on Soviet Propaganda and Active Measures

1. You will recall that we have had several conversations about papers that are projected or in train relating to Soviet foreign propaganda and active measures, and that the Director has on a number of occasions expressed an interest in what we are doing in this area--most recently in his 25 July memo to you which is attached. This is to bring you up to date about the status of several of our endeavors that respond to the Director's concerns.

2. In accordance with the recommendation that I made to you in my memo of 24 July (attached), we are moving ahead with an IIM on Soviet active measures. [ ] is the principal drafter. The IIM will draw heavily on the briefing on active measures that [ ] pulled together for the NSC in June as well as the draft active measures paper that [ ] prepared earlier (both of these papers were in the package Dick Kerr sent to the DCI in July). We anticipate having the draft IIM ready for NIO review by the end of October.

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3. We have assigned an experienced analyst, [ ] to pick up the paper on the Soviet propaganda apparatus that has been in abeyance since the DO annuitant working on it had to leave it in June. [ ] has been tied up with another project, but will be through with it and free to start the propaganda paper in September.

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4. In response to the DCI's interest in relating Soviet active measures to what the Cubans and Salvadoran insurgents are doing, we are embarking on a major study of the extent and character of coordination between the USSR and its allies in covert activities in the Third World. I believe this topic is critical to our understanding of Soviet political penetration

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techniques, but it is difficult to come to grips with and has consequently been neglected in the past. [redacted] is going to tackle this project, which is listed in our research program. He will probably begin by doing building block papers on Soviet-Cuban-East European cooperation in several regions-- Central America, Africa, the Middle East--before putting these together in a larger assessment. [redacted]

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[redacted] have given him a hardheaded appreciation of how the Soviets operate, and we expect to see some good results from his efforts over the next year.

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5. In view of the DCI's encouraging response to Dick Kerr's memo of 9 July (attached) on the semantics and structure of disinformation, we will begin planning and organizing an academic conference on the subject. We have designated [redacted] one of our Senior Analysts, as the responsible action officer. He plans to work with an experienced CA officer and an FBIS propaganda analyst in undertaking the preliminary investigation. This will involve inviting Aaron Levenstein and one or two others to the Agency for consultations and advice on such matters as the conference agenda, participation, venue, etc. We will then prepare for your comment a proposal with our views on how such a conference should be organized and executed for maximum success.

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[redacted]  
Douglas MacEachin

Attachments:  
As stated.

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84 - 2560/ //

25 July 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Soviet, Cuban, Nicaraguan Propaganda Machines and  
Active Measures

1. I've gone through these drafts on Soviet, Cuban, Nicaraguan propaganda machines and active measures. I see the one we talked about some months back got sidetracked because the DDO annuitant we put on it had to get off it. But it seems to me we have a lot of relatively current work which covers the subject and indeed is quite duplicatory. The one which has [redacted] name on the first page strikes me as having virtues of clarity, simplicity and comprehensiveness. Dick Kerr's cover note indicates some uncertainty as to how to put out the other SOVA piece. I think LA/DDO has a piece on the world-wide apparatus of the Salvadoran insurgents. [redacted]

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[redacted] the Cuban instruments for political and propaganda action. I think it would be worth the effort to publish updated work on the Soviet Union, Cuba and Nicaragua/Salvador incorporating the DDO material. [redacted]

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2. But I'm more interested in following through on Dick Kerr's suggestion (his memo of 9 July on which John scribbled "not bad"). The semantics, structure and themes of disinformation is an important subject, neglected generally in American thinking and research, it seems to me, since the days of Adolph Hitler. Yet the Big Lie rides higher than ever today. I like Dick's notions for approaching it through preliminary investigation followed by a conference. We could get a lot of talent for that--Levenson, Cherne, Ikle, Kirkpatrick, plus a roster of academics and other scholars.

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C  
William J. Casey

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24 July 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert Gates  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: Doug MacEachin  
Director, Soviet Analysis

SUBJECT: Soviet Active Measures Paper

1. When we talked about [ ] draft paper on active measures several weeks ago--a draft I inherited when I came to SOVA--we discussed whether or not to make it an IIM or a memo to holders of the 1981 IIM on this subject. You will recall that the draft does not deal comprehensively with active measures: (1) it concentrates on disinformation and use of front groups and gives scant coverage to such other important activities as use of agents of influence, efforts to destabilize foreign economies, and penetration of foreign labor unions; (2) the geographic coverage is uneven, the draft being limited largely to Soviet activities in Western Europe and Africa; (3) the draft does not cover the entire period since the 1981 IIM was written. 25X1

2. Since our discussion I have talked further with [ ] about the paper, and I have decided to recommend that we produce a full-fledged IIM. Over the past few weeks we have done considerable work to fill gaps in the draft's coverage. In particular, last month [ ] to produce a briefing (still in the DO clearance process) for the NSC that deals with the full range of active measures employed by the Soviets throughout the globe. The IIM can draw heavily on this briefing. We can also expand the time span covered in the IIM by incorporating material from the RP done in 1983 as an update to the 1981 IIM. Finally, we can draw on other research currently underway in our Security Issues branch and in OGI for updating and fleshing out sections that still need improvement. 25X1 25X1 25X1

3. All this should take three months. If you approve this plan, I believe we will be able to produce a draft IIM by the end of October that will satisfy our own requirements and stand up to NIO scrutiny. [ ] 25X1

Doug MacEachin

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DDI-~~03891/84~~

9 JUL 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: Semantics and Structure of Disinformation

1. We have given some thought to the issues raised in your correspondence with Cherne, Levenstein, et al., regarding the semantics and structure of disinformation. I agree on the importance of undertaking a serious effort to examine these issues. There are a couple of reasons why I believe such an effort should begin with a broad, theoretical inquiry--probably in a small conference outside the Agency--as a first step toward possible applications.

2. First, it seems to us that the question of the use of words and concepts as weapons against our security interests is more than simply a Soviet, or a SOVA, problem. While it certainly is true that the Soviet Union can often skillfully employ such techniques in its Communist jargon, a similar threat is real enough from countries in Latin America, the Middle East, and other areas of the world where--to cite the simplest examples-- the epithets "gringos," "yankees," "infidels," and "devils," etc., have resonance among those predisposed against Western ideals and values.

3. A second, related question is how to measure US or Western vulnerability to the use of rhetorical devices by the Soviets or others in their disinformation efforts. While a good case can be made that democracy today faces a real danger from the decline of clear thinking and language use in the U.S.--as Levenstein has forcefully argued--others might argue that Western democracies are inherently strong and not especially vulnerable to the external application of such devices. Just how vulnerable are we? Obviously, any observer's judgment depends in part on his cultural, historical, and philosophical perspectives.

4. Regardless of the extent of our vulnerability, there are things we could do to protect ourselves. Levenstein pointed to two important needs: First, to identify and define present-day propaganda techniques and, second, to examine the role that modern communication media play in influencing mass psychology. As these two are closely interconnected, they could form the basis of the theoretical inquiry that I believe should be undertaken.

5. If an appropriate effort to tackle the problem were undertaken within the Agency--say, under the auspices of the

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National Intelligence Council or within FBIS--the resource cost could be significant (if, indeed, we have the experts in semantics, philosophy, etc., that the task would require).

6. I am therefore inclined to think that a good beginning would be to arrange funding of a small but high-powered conference--the Department of State has indicated a willingness to sponsor such an affair after 1 October--that would bring together respected academics and other specialists with a wide variety of semantic, philosophical, and cultural expertise, as well as knowledge of modern media techniques. Possible hosts might include the Hoover Institution, the Rand Corporation, or the Council on Foreign Relations.

7. If you think that this is a good way to begin attacking the problem, it clearly would be worthwhile to invite Levenstein (and perhaps one or two others) for a day or so of consultations involving several Agency officers in working up an agenda for such a conference. SOVA could provide the principal contact point for such consultations and for subsequent dealings with State on questions of participation, location, etc. It would be desirable, however, to involve other Directorates in the early stage of planning--specifically, an experienced CA officer from the DO and an old hand from the FBIS Analysis Group. Together with the SOVA rep they could ensure a broad but well focused agenda relevant to national security concerns.



Richard J. Kerr

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## Attachment:

Memoranda from DCI, 8 and 19 June 1984

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24 August 1984

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FROM: Director, Office of Soviet Analysis

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Douglas MacEachin

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DDI- ~~03891184~~

JUL 1 1984

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